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Robert Dekle
Department of Economics
University of Southern California





19 W. 4th Street, 6th Floor






1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
and NBER
kortum@uchicago.eduThe United States￿chronic current account de￿cit will inevitably reverse, and the re-
versal could be quite sudden. What would this reversal mean for the United States itself
and for other countries? There are possibly major e⁄ects on relative GDP￿ s, real wages,
and real absorption, not only across countries, but across individuals within countries.
We explore this question using a gravity model of trade and production. Because it
represents the major component of trade, we focus on manufactures, asking what happens
if manufacturing is the sector that bears the burden of rebalancing trade. We pursue this
analysis using data for 2004 for the world, dividing it into forty-two countries. Table I
lists the countries, their GDP￿ s, and three di⁄erent de￿cit measures: the current account
de￿cit, the overall trade de￿cit, and the de￿cit in manufactures.1
In 2004 the United States ran a current account de￿cit of $650 billion, nearly 6 percent of
its GDP.2 Aggregating the surpluses of the three largest surplus countries, Japan, Germany,
and China, gets us to only $370 billion, little more than half the U.S. de￿cit. Note that
for each of these four countries with the largest imbalances, the manufacturing balance is
by far the largest component of the overall balance.
We build on previous work that integrates factor-market equilibrium into a model of
international production and trade with heterogeneous goods and barriers to trade. Contri-
butions include Eaton and Kortum (2002), Alvarez and Lucas (2007), and Chaney (2008).
We pursue a particular speci￿cation of gravity relationships which we introduced in Dekle,
Eaton, and Kortum (2007). Rather than estimating such a model in terms of levels, we
1We describe how we created this sample and where our data come from in Section 3.1.
2This number is not only very large absolutely, it￿ s large relative to U.S. GDP. Australia, Greece, and
Portugal have larger de￿cit to GDP ratios. Some small countries run current account surpluses that are
much larger fractions of their GDP. The Bureau of Economics Analysis reports the US current account
de￿cit in 2006 as $857 billion, 6.1 percent of GDP.
1specify the model in terms of changes from the current equilibrium. This approach allows
us to calibrate the model from existing data on production and trade shares. We thereby
￿nesse having to assemble proxies for bilateral resistance (e.g., distance, common language,
etc.) or inferring parameters of technology. A particular virtue is that we do not have to
impose the symmetry in bilateral trade ￿ ows implied by these measures but spurned by
the data. China, for example, runs the largest bilateral surplus with the United States,
while running substantial de￿cits with some of her Asian neighbors, Japan in particular.
Our approach recognizes and incorporates these bilateral asymmetries.
Our earlier work considered the e⁄ect of eliminating current account de￿cits in a world
in which factors could seamlessly move between manufacturing and other activities. While
this assumption might apply to the very long run, it probably fails to capture barriers to
internal factor mobility that are likely to loom large for some time. Here we pursue the
opposite extreme of treating factors as ￿xed in either manufacturing or nonmanufacturing
activity. For comparison purposes we present our results for the case of perfect factor
mobility as well.
In either case we allow adjustment to take the form of changes in the range of goods that
countries exchange (the extensive margin) as well as changes in the amounts of each good
traded (the intensive margin). But adjustment at the extensive margin may take time.
Hence, to capture very short run e⁄ects we consider a case in which both the allocation of
labor and the extensive margin are ￿xed.
Both this paper and our previous one return to a venerable topic, the potential for
a secondary burden of a transfer. A question we can answer is the extent to which the
elimination of the giant U.S. current account de￿cit entails a loss in real resources beyond
the loss of the transfer itself. Our model recognizes the importance of nontradability, so that
2it delivers Keynes￿prediction that the elimination of a transfer entails a worsened terms
of trade. But since our model also incorporates nontraded goods whose prices decline, the
burden of paying more for imports is mostly o⁄set by the bene￿t of cheaper nontraded
goods. With an active extensive margin, the o⁄set is nearly complete. Our numbers thus
come down on the side of Ohlin: The elimination of the transfer entails a loss in real
absorption of virtually the same magnitude.3
This prediction emerges under either extreme assumption about factor mobility. But
factor immobility introduces a major additional consideration: The internal redistribution
of income implied by global rebalancing. We ￿nd that, with resource immobility, eliminat-
ing the current account de￿cit raises the returns to U.S. factors working in manufacturing to
those working elsewhere by about 30 percent (with or without adjustment at the extensive
margin).
Obstfeld and Rogo⁄(2005) also employ a static trade model to examine the implications
of eliminating current account imbalances. Their focus is on real exchange rates and the
terms of trade, rather than real wages and welfare, our interest here. They employ a stylized
three-region model. With labor mobility our results are closest to what Obstfeld and Rogo⁄
call a ￿very gradual￿unwinding, or a decade-long adjustment, while labor immobility (with
or without an operative extensive margin) connects better with their baseline scenario.4
3While our framework can quite handily deal with a multitude of countries, its analytic essence derives
from the two-country model of trade and unilateral transfers of Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977).
4Corsetti, Martin, and Pesenti (2007) develop a symmetric two-country model in which adjustment can
also occur across both the intensive and extensive margins. They examine the long-run consequences of
the e⁄ects of improving net export de￿cits of 6.5 percent of GDP in one country to a balanced position.
In the version of the model in which all adjustment takes place at the intensive margin, the authors ￿nd
that closing the external imbalance requires a fall in long-run consumption (of the country undergoing the
3We proceed as follows: Section 1 speci￿es a world model of production and trade in
manufactures, allowing for both perfect immobility and perfect mobility of labor. How
we calibrate this model to data on production and trade shares is the topic of Section 2.
Sections 3 reports our results for various cases and Section 4 concludes.
1 A Model of the World
We consider a world of i = 1;:::;N countries. Country i is endowed with labor Li.5 Labor
is allocated between two sectors, manufacturing LM






i = Li: (1)
Throughout we assume that all production is at constant returns to scale and that all
markets are perfectly competitive.6
1.1 Income and Expenditure: Some Accounting
We relate production and trade in manufactures to aggregate income, expenditure, and
wages. We have to do some accounting to draw these connections.
adjustment) by around 6 percent and a depreciation of the real exchange rate, and the terms of trade by
17 percent and 22 percent, respectively. When adjustment can also occur at the extensive margin, there
is a much smaller depreciation in the real exchange rate, and in the terms of trade, of 1.1 percent and 6.4
respectively. The changes in consumption, and welfare, under the two versions of the model, however, are
similar.
5To generalize our analysis to incorporate multiple factors of production one may think of Li as a vector
of factors.
6See Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2008) to see how the model could be respeci￿ed in terms of mo-
nopolistic competition with heterogeneous ￿rms, as in Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008). There are no
essential di⁄erences for the conclusions we draw here.
4We denote country i￿ s gross production of manufactures as Y M
i of which a share ￿i




i , where wM
i is the manufacturing wage.
Similarly, wN



























then GDP is simply Yi = wiLi: Our notation is designed to admit: (i) sectoral labor
mobility, in which case LM
i and LN
i are endogenous with wM
i = wN
i = wi and (ii) immobile
labor, in which case LM
i and LN
i are ￿xed with wages typically di⁄ering by sector.
We denote country i￿ s gross absorption of manufactures as XM
i and its manufacturing
de￿cit as DM
i : They are connected with Y M








Manufactures have two purposes, as inputs into the production of manufactures and to
satisfy ￿nal demand. We denote the share of manufactures in ￿nal demand as ￿i so that
demand for manufactures in country i is:
X
M
i = ￿iXi + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿i)Y
M
i (4)
where Xi is ￿nal absorption, equal to GDP Yi plus the overall trade de￿cit Di; and ￿ is
the share of nonmanufactures (hence 1 ￿ ￿ the share of manufactures) in manufacturing
5intermediates.7
Combining (3) and (4) we get:









￿i(wiLi + Di) ￿ DM
i





￿i(wiLi + Di) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿i)DM
i
￿(1 ￿ ￿i) + ￿i
: (6)
These equations will allow us to connect world equilibrium in manufactures to various
de￿cits.
1.2 International Trade
Manufactures consist of a unit continuum of di⁄erentiated goods indexed by j: We denote
country i￿ s e¢ ciency making good j as zi(j). The cost of producing good j in country i is













where pi is an index of manufacturing input prices in country i, to be determined be-
low. The term ￿i is a constant that depends on ￿, ￿i, and the productivity of labor in
7More precisely the parameter ￿i captures both manufactures used in ￿nal absorption and manufactures
used as intermediates in the production of nonmanufactures. For simplicity, we ignore this feedback from
the manufacturing sector to the nonmanufacturing sector. As we discuss below, this feedback appears to
be small.
6nonmanufacturing.8
We make the standard assumption of ￿iceberg￿trade barriers, implying that to deliver
one unit of a manufactured good from country i to country n requires shipping dni ￿ 1
units, where we normalize dii = 1. Thus, delivering a unit of good j produced in country i






Here we set up the model assuming that buyers purchase any good from its lowest cost
source, so that the extensive margin is active. We turn to what happens if this margin is
shut o⁄ in Section 1.2.3.2 below.
As in Eaton and Kortum (2002) country i￿ s e¢ ciency zi(j) in making good j is the
realization of a random variable Z with distribution:
Fi(z) = Pr[Z ￿ z] = e
￿Tiz￿￿
which is drawn independently across i: Here Ti > 0 is a parameter that re￿ ects country i￿ s
overall e¢ ciency in producing any good and ￿ is an inverse measure of the dispersion of
e¢ ciencies. The implied distribution of pni(j) is:






= 1 ￿ e
￿Ti(cidni)￿￿p￿
:
8If the unit cost function in nonmanufactures is wN
i =ai; re￿ ecting productivity ai; then:
￿i = (ai)￿￿(1￿￿i)￿
￿￿i
i [￿(1 ￿ ￿i)]
￿￿(1￿￿i) [(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿i)]
￿(1￿￿)(1￿￿i) :





The distribution Gn(p) of prices paid in country n is
Gn(p) = Pr[Pn ￿ p] = 1 ￿
N Y
i=1














Invoking the law of large numbers, this probability becomes the measure of goods that
country n purchases from country i. Thus ￿ni is a bilateral trade share measured by
numbers of goods. To obtain a trade share measured by expenditures we must specify
demand.
1.2.2 Demand for Manufactures
We assume that the individual manufacturing goods, whether used as intermediates or in












8where pn is the the manufacturing price index in country n; which appeared previously in
expression (7) for the cost of an input bundle. We compute this price index by integrating

















and ￿ is the gamma function, requiring ￿ > ￿ ￿ 1.

















ni is average spending per good in country n on goods purchased from i.
To compute X
M
ni we need to know the distribution Gni(p) of the prices of goods that













As shown in Eaton and Kortum (2002), among the goods that n buys from i, the distri-















The two measures of the bilateral trade share reduce to the same thing.
91.2.3 Trade Elasticities
How do trade shares and prices respond to changes in input costs around the world? Say
that the costs of input bundles in each country k move from ck to c0
k. We can represent
this change in terms of the ratio b ck = c0
k=ck.
Extension Margin Operative We ￿rst consider the case in which a buyer can switch




























The parameter determining how changes in costs translate into trade shares is ￿, which
re￿ ects the extent of heterogeneity in production e¢ ciency. It captures how changes in
costs bring about a change in international specialization in production and delivery to
various markets, the extensive margin.
We also need to consider how price indices adjust to a change in costs around the world.






























Note that ￿ is nowhere to be seen.
Extensive Margin Inoperative Say instead that after input costs change, countries
are stuck buying each good from the same source as before, so that adjustment is only
in how much is spent on each good, the intensive margin. To see what happens to trade
10shares, return to equation (10), this time shutting down the extensive margin by ￿xing the
￿nk￿ s.
The price of any good that country n had bought from country i at price p now costs
pb ci: If country n goes on buying each good from its original source, the resulting bilateral




































Assuming that we started with a situation in which country n bought every good from the














The parameter now determining how changes in costs translate into trade shares becomes
￿ ￿ 1, as in the Armington model. Since ￿ > ￿ ￿ 1, the e⁄ective trade elasticity is lower
when we shut down the extensive margin.
Parallel to (12) above, we also need an expression for the change in the price index in
each country that results from a change in input costs. To derive this expression, recall




































The elasticity ￿ ￿ 1 again replaces ￿ as the relevant parameter when we shut down the
extensive margin. In all other ways, the analysis is exactly parallel.
11We will return to this result in our simulations where we interpret ￿ ￿ 1 as the short-
term trade elasticity. This interpretation is motivated by the dynamic 2-country analysis
of Ruhl (2005) in which ￿rms choose not to adjust their extensive margin in response to
temporary ￿ uctuations in costs. In this case, all adjustment takes place via expenditure
per good resulting from changes in prices and incomes.
1.3 Equilibrium









This set of equations determines relative wages across countries. To see how, plug in the
expressions above for manufacturing production (5) and absorption (6) to get
￿i(wiLi + Di) ￿ DM
i






￿n(wnLn + Dn) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿n)DM
n
￿(1 ￿ ￿n) + ￿n
￿
: (16)




















































i = wiLi ￿ ￿i
￿i(wiLi + Di) ￿ DM
i
￿(1 ￿ ￿i) + ￿i
: (19)
12World equilibrium is a set of wages and price levels wM
i ; wN
i and pi and labor allocations
LM
i ; and LN
i for each country i that solve equations (1), (2), (16), (17), (18), and (19)
given parameters including labor endowments and de￿cits, Di and DM
i . To complete the
description of equilibrium, we have to take a stand on labor mobility.
We consider the two extremes of internal labor market mobility. In the mobile labor
case, which we take as re￿ ecting the long run, the wage equilibrates between sectors, so
that wM
i = wN
i = wi with LM
i and LN
i determined endogenously. In the immobile labor
case, which we take as re￿ ecting the short tun, workers are tied to either manufacturing or
nonmanufacturing. For this case we take LM
i and LN




Our counterfactual experiments calculate the response of all endogenous variables to an
exogenous change in de￿cits around the world.
2 Quanti￿cation
We now turn to how we quantify the model.
2.1 Data
We created our sample of 42 countries as follows. We began with the ￿fty largest as mea-
sured by GDP in 2000, and combined the others into a ￿country￿labeled ROW. Incomplete
data forced us to move Saudi Arabia, Poland, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Puerto Rico,
and the Czech Republic into ROW as well. Because of peculiarities in the data suggestive
of entrep￿t trade, which our approach here is ill-equipped to handle, we combined (1) Bel-
gium and Luxembourg (which we pulled out of ROW), (2) China and Hong Kong, and (3)
13Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore into single entities. The result is 42 entities, which
we refer to as countries, that constitute the entire world.
To solve for the counterfactual, we need data on GDP (for Yi), manufacturing value
added (for V M
i ), gross manufacturing production (for Y M
i ); overall and manufacturing
trade de￿cits (Di and DM
i ), and bilateral trade ￿ ows in manufactures (for XM
ni ); including
purchases from home XM
ii :
Wherever possible we take data for 2004 with all magnitudes translated into US$billions.
We take GDP Yi and manufacturing value added V M
i from the United Nations National
Income Accounts Database (2007). We calculate value added in nonmanufacturing as a
residual, V N
i = Yi ￿ V M
i :
The overall trade de￿cit in goods and services Di and current account de￿cits CAi;
used for our counterfactual experiments below, are from the IMF (2006). We calculate
total ￿nal spending as Xi = Yi + Di.9
Our handling of production and bilateral trade in manufactures is more involved. Our
goal is a matrix of values XM
ni of the manufactures that country n buy from i. We begin
with Comtrade data on bilateral trade from the United Nations Statistics Division (2006).
We de￿ne manufactures as SITC trade codes 5, 6, 7, and 8. We measure trade ￿ ows
between countries using reports of the importing country. We netted out trade within the
three entities containing multiple countries.
Bilateral trade data do not contain an entry for the value of manufactures that country
9We have to confront the problem that the data imply nonzero current account and trade balances for
the world as a whole. Our procedures can￿ t explain this discrepancy so we allocated the de￿cits to countries
in proportion to their GDP￿ s. Since we use only importer data to measure bilateral trade in manufactures,
world trade in manufactures balances automatically.
14i purchases from local producers, XM
ii . We calculate these diagonal elements of the bilateral
trade matrix as follows: (1) For each country i we calculate the share of value added in
manufacturing ￿i as the ratio of value added in manufacturing to total manufacturing
production for the most recent year for which each is available (and not imputed) from
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization Industrial Statistics Database
(2006).10 (2) We create a value of Y M
i for 2004 as Y M
i = V M
i =￿i using the 2004 value for
V M
i . (3) We calculate XM
ii = Y M
i ￿ EM
i where EM






With our bilateral trade matrix, we can calculate the trade de￿cit in manufactures,
DM
i . Except for the numbers used to calculate ￿i; all data are for 2004, the most recent
year for which we could get complete data.
2.2 Calibration
In principle, computing the world equilibrium requires knowing the parameters dni; ￿i;
￿i; ￿i; ￿; Ti; Li (LM
i and LN
i separately in the case of factor immobility); and ￿ (or ￿ in
the case with no extensive margin) as well as the actual and counterfactual overall and
manufacturing de￿cits Di, D0
i, DM
i , and DM0
i . However, since we only consider changes
from the current equilibrium, all we need to know about dni; Ti; and ￿i is contained in the
current trade shares ￿ni while all we need to know about LM
i and LN
i is contained in value
added V M
i and V N
i :
We set ￿ = 8:28; the central value Eaton and Kortum (2002) report based on bilat-
eral trade and cross-country product-level price data. We also report the implications of
10For each country i other than ROW a measure of ￿ is available in some year in the interval 1991-2003.
Our measore of ￿ for ROW is the simple average of the ￿ ￿ s across countries not in ROW.
15shutting down the extensive margin by replacing ￿ with ￿ ￿ 1. There are a wide range of
estimates of ￿ that we might consider. Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) ￿nd
that ￿ = 3:79 (and ￿ = 3:60) explains the size and productivity of advantage of U.S. plants
that export. Ruhl (2005) ￿nds that ￿ = 2:0 can reconcile the time series data regarding the
degree of adjustment in trade balances to temporary changes in relative costs. To create a
sharper contrast with simulations in which the extensive margin is active, and because our
approach here is inspired by Ruhl (2005), we go with the lower value.
We calculate the share of nonmanufactures in manufacturing intermediates ￿ from
input-output tables. We don￿ t have enough input-output tables to calculate ￿ for each
country. Instead we calculate ￿ = 0:43 from the 1997 input-output use table of the United
States, and apply this value for all countries (Organization of Cooperation and Develop-
ment, 2007).11
Using (3) and (4), we calculate ￿i as:
￿i =
V M





Table II presents the values of ￿i and ￿i for our 42 countries, along with data on the
share of manufacturing value added in GDP and the share of exports in manufacturing
gross production. Of our countries, Algeria has the smallest share of manufacturing value
added (at 0:06) and China/Hong Kong (henceforth China) the largest (0:38). Argentina
and Egypt have the least outwardly-oriented manufacturing sector (10 percent exported),
and Malaysia/Philippines/Singapore the most outwardly-oriented (94 percent exported).
The share of value added in manufacturing ￿ averages around a third, with India having
11As mentioned earlier, we do not take account of the use of manufactures as intermediates in the
production of nonmanufactures. According to the 1997 input output use table for the United States, the
share of intermediates in the gross production of nonmanufactures is 8.5%.
16the lowest value (0:19), and Brazil the highest (0:53). The calculated share of manufactures
in ￿nal demand ranges from a low of 0:06 in Ireland to a high of 0:78 in China/Hong Kong.
In spite of these outliers, the values of ￿ are each typically between 0:25 and 0:50.
2.3 Counterfactual De￿cits
Our counterfactual is a world in which production and trade in manufactures has adjusted
to eliminate all current account imbalances. Not modeling nonmanufacturing trade, we
hold nonmanufacturing trade de￿cits at their 2004 level as a share of world GDP. We thus















Table III reports the actual and counterfactual trade de￿cits both overall and in manu-
factures. Notice that the United States must run a surplus in manufactures of over two
hundred billion dollars to balance its current account.
2.4 Formulation in Terms of Changes
As for Ti;￿i; and dni; direct observations are hard to come by. Instead of attaching num-
bers to them, and to Li as well, we reformulate the model to express the equilibrating
relationships in terms of aggregates of these parameters that are readily observable. We
then solve for the proportional changes in wages and prices needed to eliminate current
17account de￿cits. We use x0 to denote the counterfactual value of variable x and b x to denote
x0=x. We will repeatedly use the fact that factor payments correspond to value added,
so that wk0
i Lk
i = b wk
i wk
i Lk
i = b wk
i V k
i in each sector k = M;N; as well as in the aggregate
w0
iLi = b wiwiLi = b wiYi.
Starting with the equation for the average wage (2), we have









where the sectoral shares are sM
i = V M
i =Yi and sN
i = V N
i =Yi. The goods market clearing
condition (16) becomes
￿i(b wiYi + D0
i) ￿ DM0
i








￿n(b wnYn + D0
n) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿n)DM0
n
￿(1 ￿ ￿n) + ￿n
￿
: (21)

















































b wiYi ￿ ￿i
￿i(b wiYi + D0
i) ￿ DM0
i
￿(1 ￿ ￿i) + ￿i
￿
: (24)
In the case of mobile labor, b V N
i = b LN
i with
b wi = b w
M
i = b w
N
i : (25)
In the case of immobile labor,
b V
N





In the case of immobile labor with no extensive margin we simply replace ￿ with ￿ ￿ 1
in equations (22) and (23).
The parameters Ti; dni;￿i; LM
i ; and LN
i no longer appear. Instead we have manufactur-
ing value added V M
i ; nonmanufacturing value added V N
i ; and manufacturing trade shares
￿ni; not the counterfactual values but the actual (factual) ones, XM
ni =XM
n . We can thus
use data on V M
n ; V N
n ; and XM
ni =XM
n , along with the parameters ￿i; ￿i; ￿; and ￿ (or ￿ with
no extensive margin) to solve the counterfactual equilibrium changes b wM
i ; b wN
i ; b V N
i ; and b pi




Simple iterative procedures solve equations (20) through (24) for changes in wages, em-
ployment, and prices, with equations (26) and (25) employed appropriately for the case at
hand. With 42 countries, a good quality laptop running GAUSS can deliver the solutions

















b wi = 1:
For each of our 42 countries we present the change in a set of outcomes, presented as
the ratio of the counterfactual value to its original value.
In the case of factor immobility, we present the change in manufacturing wage b wM
i ;
nonmanufacturing wage b wN
i ; and the change in the overall wage b wi, using (20). The change
19in the overall wage corresponds to the change in GDP, since Y 0
i = b wiYi. With factor
mobility we simply solve for b wi.
Since we solve for the change in the manufacturing price index b pi, we can calculate the
change in the cost of living as b pL




￿1￿￿i. We can thus calculate the changes in
real wages and real GDP.
Taking into account the static gain or loss of the transfers themselves, we get the change










The counterfactual bilateral trade share of country i in n; ￿ni; can be constructed from the
original shares using the expressions (22). The counterfactual bilateral trade ￿ ow of n￿ s









n) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿n)DM0
n
￿(1 ￿ ￿n) + ￿n
￿
:













We now turn to the results.
3 Results
In discussing the results, we work backwards. Since it is conceptually simplest and relates
to our earlier work, we start with the longest run in which both the allocation of labor and
the extensive margin can adjust. We then look at a medium run in which labor is locked
into its initial sector, but the extensive margin still operates. We conclude with the very
20short run in which neither margin can adjust: Labor is immobile and there is no change in
the set of goods that countries buy from each other, only how much they buy. Out tables
report all results in terms of relative changes, so that if a variable changed from x to x0 the
table reports b x = x0=x:12
3.1 Labor Mobility
Table IV reports results for the mobile-factor case. With labor mobility, there is a single
national wage whose change equals the change in GDP. The changes in wages are reported
in the ￿rst column. As noted above they are calculated so that world GDP remains the
same.
Note that relative wage changes are quite modest. Taking one of the largest swings
the U.S. wage (and hence GDP) falls relative to Japan￿ s by less than 8 percent. Because
most goods aren￿ t traded, price indices, reported in the second and third columns, move in
the same direction as wages, resulting in changes to real wages (equivalently real GDP￿ s),
reported in the fourth column, nearly always a fraction of a percent.
In countries initially in de￿cit, labor shifts from nonmanufacturing to manufacturing to
pay o⁄ the de￿cit. The change in the manufacturing share is shown in the ￿fth column.
Note that the shifts can be substantial, with the share for the United States rising by almost
23 percent (about 3 percentage points). The manufacturing sector in Japan declines by 8
percent.
The last column of Table IV shows the change in real absorption. This change is
dominated by the primary burden of paying down the de￿cit. The United States experiences
12In the text we refer to a percentage change in x as 100(b x￿1) and the percentage change in x2 relative
to x1 as 100[(b x2=b x1) ￿ 1]:
21a 6 percent decline in real absorption while Japan￿ s and Germany￿ s rises by around 4
percent. The change in real absorption corresponds almost exactly to the change in the
transfers involved in eliminating current account de￿cits. Quantitatively, then, Ohlin was
right. There is no discernible secondary burden to eliminating the transfer.
To what extent could we have predicted the changes in wages (and GDP￿ s) from the
size of the current account surplus that had to be eliminated? Figure 1 plots the change in
the wage reported in the ￿rst column of Table IV against the initial current account de￿cit
as a share of GDP (with country codes as listed in Table I). Note that there is a de￿nite
negative relationship. Mexico and Canada are a bit below other countries with similar
de￿cits, re￿ ecting their proximity to the United States whose relative GDP has declined
substantially. There is also a systematic positive relationship between the initial de￿cit
and the change in the size of the manufacturing sector. Figure 2 plots the change in the
size of the manufacturing sector (column 5 of Table IV) against the initial current account
as a share of GDP. These results closely match those in Dekle, Eaton, Kortum (2007).
3.2 Labor Immobility
Behind the mild price e⁄ects of eliminating the de￿cits just reported are big movements in
labor across sectors. What if instead a worker is stuck in the sector where she is initially
employed? The ￿rst two columns of Table V report the changes in relative wages that our
model says are needed for manufacturing to balance current accounts, the results for b wM
i
and b wN
i ; respectively. Again, these changes leave world GDP unchanged. The third column
indicates what happens to GDP overall.
Except for Canada, the GDP changes are always in the same direction as in the case
of mobile labor, but the magnitudes of the changes are much larger. The United States
22shrinks relative to Japan by 22 percent (as opposed to 8 percent in the previous case).
Figure 3 plots the change in GDP against the initial current account de￿cit as a share of
GDP, using the same scale as Figure 1. Note that the relationship is again negative and
about twice as steep as in the case of labor mobility. Hence eliminating countries￿ability
to reallocate resources requires substantially more adjustment in relative GDP￿ s.
Nearly as systematic is the tendency of the wage in manufacturing relative to nonman-
ufacturing to rise in countries initially in de￿cit with the opposite in surplus countries. In
the United States, the relative wage in manufacturing rises by 29 percent. The change for
Australia, another large de￿cit country, is nearly as large. In Japan and Germany, the
largest surplus countries, the relative wage of manufacturing workers declines by around
10 percent. Looking across countries, changes in nonmanufacturing wages contribute much
more to changes in relative GDP. Figure 4 plots the change in the manufacturing share
against the initial current account de￿cit as a share of GDP. Note the systematically posi-
tive relationship.
Because of the pervasiveness of nontradedness, both the price index of manufactures
(reported in the fourth column of Table V) and the overall price index (reported in the
fourth column of Table VI) move in line with relative GDP. As a consequence, changes in
real GDP (reported in the third column of Table VI) are much smaller than the changes in
relative GDP. While the secondary burden of eliminating current account de￿cits is about
twice what it was with labor mobility, it remains a tiny percentage of the initial de￿cit.
Although aggregate changes are small, the redistributional e⁄ects are substantial. Col-
umn 1 of Table VI shows real gains to labor in the manufacturing sector in countries that
are initially in de￿cit. In the United States, the real wage in manufacturing rises by 24
percent but declines by 4 percent outside manufacturing. In Japan, the real manufacturing
23wage declines by 9 percent with a 2 percent gain in nonmanufacturing. In every country
the real wage moves in opposite directions in the two sectors.
3.3 No Extensive Margin
Sticking with a situation of labor immobility, we now take the further step of eliminating
the extensive margin of adjustment. We interpret this case as applying to the very short
run. Implementing this case amounts to replacing ￿ with ￿ ￿ 1 in our solution algorithm
described above. As mentioned, we follow Ruhl (2005) in setting ￿ = 2:0. There are
thus two interpretations of what we are doing in this case. One is that the parameter
￿ = 8:28 is as above, but with no adjustment on the extensive margin, the parameter
￿ = 2 becomes the relevant one governing adjustment. Another interpretation is that we
are simply repeating the immobile labor case, now using the much lower value of ￿ = 1.
The results are shown in Tables VII and VIII. Focussing on relative GDP changes (in
column 3 of Table VII), we see that they are magni￿ed considerably when the extensive
margin is inoperable. U.S. GDP falls by about 30 percent, while Japan￿ s rises by 26 percent
relative to the world. Figure 5 plots the change in GDP against the initial de￿cit as a share
of GDP, again using the same scale as Figure 1. Note that the relationship has become
twice as steep again as that portrayed in Figure 3. Note also that U.S. neighbors Canada
and Mexico have fallen further below the rest.
As in the previous case, most of the GDP adjustment occurs through the nonmanu-
facturing wage. Figure 6 plots the change in the manufacturing share against the initial
current account de￿cit. It looks very similar to Figure 4.
Again, prices tend to move in line with relative GDP, so that changes in real GDP are
small. They are, nonetheless, substantially larger than in the previous two cases. Note
24that U.S. real GDP falls by about 2 percent, about a third of the initial de￿cit. Hence with
a very low response of trade shares to costs, a nontrivial secondary burden appears.
Qualitatively the consequences of adjustment for real wages are much as in the previ-
ous case, with the manufacturing real wage rising in de￿cit countries and falling in surplus
countries. For the United States, at least, the burden of the inability to adjust at the
extensive margin is born by workers outside manufacturing. The increase in the manufac-
turing real wage is as in the previous case, but the decline in the nonmanufacturing wage
is greater.
4 Conclusion
We have revisited the question of the secondary burden of transfers using a forty-two coun-
try gravity model of international production and trade in manufactures. Our motivation
is to assess the implications for relative wages, relative GDP￿ s, real wages, and real absorp-
tion in the major countries of the world should the current transfers implied by existing
current account de￿cits come to a halt. How much relative GDP￿ s need to change depends
on ￿ exibility of two forms, factor mobility between manufacturing and nonmanufacturing
and the ability of trade to adjust at the extensive margin. With perfect mobility and an
active extensive margin the GDP of the United States (running the largest de￿cit) must
fall about 8 percent relative to that of Japan (running the largest surplus). Without mobil-
ity, however, the decline is 22 percent. If there is no adjustment in supplier sourcing (the
extensive margin) either, the decline is 44 percent.
Because of the pervasiveness of nontraded goods, however, prices move largely in sync
with relative GDP￿ s so that aggregate real changes are much more muted. Regardless of
25the degree of labor mobility, the decline in U.S. real GDP is only 0.4 percent if the extensive
margin is operative. Without an extensive margin, the drop rises to 2 percent of GDP. So
only with extreme in￿ exibility does a secondary burden of eliminating the transfer inherent
in the U.S. current account de￿cit show up.
While the overall real e⁄ects are small, with factor immobility redistributional e⁄ects are
substantial. Regardless of whether the extensive margin is operative, eliminating current
account de￿cits leads to a rise in the U.S. wage in manufactures relative to nonmanufactures
of around 30 percent, re￿ ecting a 24 percent real increase for manufacturing workers and a
decline of around 5 percent for nonmanufacturing workers. In the long run in which labor is
mobile, this wage di⁄erence induces an increase in the manufacturing share of employment
of 23 percent.
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28TABLE I: GDP AND DEFICIT MEASURES, 2004
GDP
country code CA Trade Manuf.
ALGERIA alg 85 -11.2 -7.2 11.8
ARGENTINA arg 153 -3.6 -11.0 9.5
AUSTRALIA aul 659 39.2 21.8 57.5
AUSTRIA aut 293 -1.2 -4.4 7.3
BELGIUM/LUXEM bex 392 -16.6 -20.5 52.6
BRAZIL bra 604 -12.5 -26.1 -8.8
CANADA can 992 -22.5 -35.7 22.5
CHILE chl 96 -1.7 -8.1 -2.4
CHINA/HK chk 2106 -87.2 -54.0 -119.4
COLOMBIA col 98 0.8 0.8 8.2
DENMARK den 245 -6.3 -11.3 9.3
EGYPT egy 82 -4.0 0.8 1.1
FINLAND fin 189 -9.9 -9.6 -17.1
FRANCE fra 2060 4.1 7.4 -3.3
GERMANY ger 2740 -105.4 -122.9 -278.3
GREECE gre 264 13.1 13.9 29.2
INDIA ind 689 -7.8 14.5 -11.9
INDONESIA ino 254 -1.9 -10.1 -25.1
IRELAND ire 183 0.8 -25.5 -68.8
ISRAEL isr 122 -3.3 0.1 -2.2
ITALY ita 1720 13.4 -4.0 -46.6
JAPAN jap 4580 -178.1 -72.4 -385.1
KOREA kor 680 -29.1 -26.3 -146.4
MA/PHI/SING mps 312 -43.2 -45.9 -58.3
MEXICO mex 683 5.8 17.8 20.2
NETHERLANDS net 608 -55.2 -44.4 8.9
NEW ZEALAND nze 98 6.3 1.1 10.0
NORWAY nor 255 -35.1 -34.9 16.0
PAKISTAN pak 113 0.7 6.5 -0.9
PERU per 70 -0.1 -1.6 2.5
PORTUGAL por 178 12.7 14.3 9.8
RUSSIA rus 592 -59.4 -69.6 -11.7
SOUTH AFRICA saf 216 7.2 2.6 1.0
SPAIN spa 1040 53.5 44.8 61.7
SWEDEN swe 349 -27.9 -27.4 -26.2
SWITZERLAND swi 360 -57.1 -32.8 -13.4
THAILAND tha 161 -7.1 -6.0 -21.1
TURKEY tur 302 15.2 12.5 18.0
UNITED KINGDOM unk 2150 32.3 74.2 103.5
UNITED STATES usa 11700 649.7 667.0 438.4
VENEZUELA ven 112 -14.0 -17.3 6.0
REST OF WORLD row 3025 -53.4 -171.3 341.9
All data are in US$ billions. Negative numbers indicate surplus.
MA/PHI/SING is a combination of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore.
DeficitsTABLE II: MANUFACTURING SHARE OF GDP, EXPORT SHARE OF MANUFACTURING, SHARE OF 
MANUFACTURING IN FINAL DEMAND (ALPHA), AND SHARE OF VALUE ADDED IN MANUFACTURING 
GROSS OUTPUT (BETA)
country Vmfg/GDP exports/Ymfg alpha beta
ALGERIA 0.06 0.14 0.26 0.34
ARGENTINA 0.22 0.10 0.52 0.33
AUSTRALIA 0.11 0.15 0.26 0.39
AUSTRIA 0.17 0.57 0.34 0.35
BELGIUM/LUXEM 0.15 0.83 0.48 0.27
BRAZIL 0.22 0.22 0.30 0.53
CANADA 0.17 0.47 0.32 0.38
CHILE 0.16 0.46 0.26 0.40
CHINA/HK 0.38 0.23 0.78 0.27
COLOMBIA 0.15 0.19 0.31 0.46
DENMARK 0.12 0.68 0.23 0.45
EGYPT 0.18 0.10 0.41 0.27
FINLAND 0.20 0.44 0.32 0.32
FRANCE 0.12 0.30 0.31 0.22
GERMANY 0.20 0.44 0.31 0.31
GREECE 0.08 0.15 0.25 0.34
INDIA 0.15 0.12 0.38 0.19
INDONESIA 0.28 0.28 0.39 0.39
IRELAND 0.24 0.93 0.06 0.34
ISRAEL 0.14 0.72 0.23 0.35
ITALY 0.17 0.27 0.35 0.26
JAPAN 0.21 0.25 0.29 0.36
KOREA 0.26 0.64 0.23 0.38
MA/PHI/SING 0.27 0.94 0.44 0.29
MEXICO 0.16 0.47 0.32 0.35
NETHERLANDS 0.13 0.63 0.31 0.27
NEW ZEALAND 0.15 0.18 0.37 0.34
NORWAY 0.10 0.27 0.31 0.30
PAKISTAN 0.17 0.18 0.31 0.31
PERU 0.15 0.15 0.30 0.37
PORTUGAL 0.14 0.35 0.32 0.28
RUSSIA 0.16 0.26 0.28 0.38
SOUTH AFRICA 0.17 0.25 0.35 0.29
SPAIN 0.15 0.24 0.36 0.27
SWEDEN 0.18 0.58 0.27 0.34
SWITZERLAND 0.19 0.66 0.30 0.39
THAILAND 0.35 0.67 0.45 0.40
TURKEY 0.20 0.32 0.39 0.38
UNITED KINGDOM 0.13 0.30 0.29 0.32
UNITED STATES 0.13 0.22 0.22 0.48
VENEZUELA 0.17 0.16 0.34 0.51
REST OF WORLD 0.15 0.45 0.42 0.34
Vmfg is value added in manufacturing, Ymfg is gross production in
manufacturing, beta is the share of value added in gross production, 
and alpha is the share of manufactures in final absorption.
SharesTABLE III: ACTUAL AND COUNTERFACTUAL TRADE DEFICITS
(OVERALL AND MANUFACTURES)
country total mfg total mfg
ALGERIA -7.24 11.80 4.00 23.03
ARGENTINA -11.02 9.52 -7.39 13.15
AUSTRALIA 21.84 57.53 -17.35 18.34
AUSTRIA -4.36 7.25 -3.21 8.41
BELGIUM/LUXEM -20.52 52.58 -3.90 69.19
BRAZIL -26.12 -8.84 -13.58 3.71
CANADA -35.70 22.53 -13.23 45.00
CHILE -8.05 -2.43 -6.34 -0.71
CHINA/HK -53.97 -119.36 33.22 -32.18
COLOMBIA 0.80 8.21 -0.01 7.40
DENMARK -11.26 9.28 -5.00 15.54
EGYPT 0.79 1.12 4.82 5.15
FINLAND -9.56 -17.08 0.39 -7.13
FRANCE 7.41 -3.27 3.34 -7.34
GERMANY -122.90 -278.28 -17.47 -172.85
GREECE 13.86 29.18 0.71 16.03
INDIA 14.46 -11.87 22.22 -4.10
INDONESIA -10.13 -25.14 -8.23 -23.25
IRELAND -25.48 -68.85 -26.31 -69.69
ISRAEL 0.13 -2.19 3.45 1.13
ITALY -3.99 -46.57 -17.42 -60.00
JAPAN -72.41 -385.08 105.74 -206.94
KOREA -26.29 -146.38 2.79 -117.30
MA/PHI/SING -45.94 -58.26 -2.71 -15.03
MEXICO 17.79 20.16 12.00 14.37
NETHERLANDS -44.38 8.90 10.84 64.12
NEW ZEALAND 1.07 9.99 -5.26 3.67
NORWAY -34.91 15.96 0.14 51.01
PAKISTAN 6.52 -0.93 5.85 -1.60
PERU -1.62 2.47 -1.54 2.55
PORTUGAL 14.34 9.81 1.61 -2.92
RUSSIA -69.57 -11.67 -10.19 47.71
SOUTH AFRICA 2.64 1.01 -4.52 -6.15
SPAIN 44.79 61.73 -8.69 8.24
SWEDEN -27.42 -26.19 0.53 1.76
SWITZERLAND -32.76 -13.38 24.30 43.68
THAILAND -5.98 -21.06 1.09 -13.99
TURKEY 12.53 18.01 -2.67 2.81
UNITED KINGDOM 74.19 103.50 41.87 71.18
UNITED STATES 666.97 438.40 17.23 -211.34
VENEZUELA -17.27 5.97 -3.29 19.95
REST OF WORLD -171.29 341.91 -117.85 395.34
All data are in US$ billions.
Actual Deficit Counterfactual DeficitTABLE IV: CHANGES IN WAGE (GDP), MANUFACTURING PRICE INDEX, AGGREGATE PRICE INDEX, REAL 
WAGE (REAL GDP), MANUFACTURING SHARE, AND REAL ABSORPTION
(FACTOR MOBILITY)
wage real wage mfg real
country (GDP) mfg aggregate (real GDP) share absorption
ALGERIA 1.205 1.055 1.164 1.035 0.469 1.176
ARGENTINA 1.020 1.016 1.018 1.002 0.978 1.029
AUSTRALIA 0.946 0.969 0.952 0.994 1.235 0.935
AUSTRIA 1.015 1.016 1.015 1.000 0.993 1.004
BELGIUM/LUXEM 1.021 1.013 1.017 1.004 0.944 1.049
BRAZIL 1.019 1.015 1.018 1.001 0.952 1.023
CANADA 0.991 0.983 0.988 1.003 0.943 1.026
CHILE 1.017 1.009 1.015 1.002 0.950 1.023
CHINA/HK 1.015 1.015 1.015 1.000 0.989 1.042
COLOMBIA 1.000 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.025 0.992
DENMARK 1.033 1.022 1.031 1.003 0.901 1.030
EGYPT 1.052 1.043 1.048 1.003 0.931 1.049
FINLAND 1.037 1.027 1.034 1.003 0.905 1.059
FRANCE 1.009 1.009 1.009 1.000 1.004 0.998
GERMANY 1.025 1.018 1.023 1.002 0.930 1.043
GREECE 0.958 0.984 0.964 0.993 1.232 0.946
INDIA 1.016 1.015 1.016 1.000 0.982 1.011
INDONESIA 1.012 1.012 1.012 1.000 0.988 1.008
IRELAND 1.006 1.003 1.006 1.000 1.005 0.996
ISRAEL 1.011 1.008 1.010 1.001 0.916 1.028
ITALY 1.007 1.010 1.008 0.999 1.013 0.991
JAPAN 1.033 1.027 1.031 1.002 0.920 1.040
KOREA 1.023 1.015 1.021 1.002 0.915 1.046
MA/PHI/SING 1.049 1.008 1.031 1.018 0.860 1.184
MEXICO 0.977 0.980 0.978 0.999 1.018 0.991
NETHERLANDS 1.053 1.020 1.043 1.010 0.793 1.108
NEW ZEALAND 0.958 0.973 0.963 0.994 1.139 0.929
NORWAY 1.131 1.063 1.110 1.019 0.651 1.182
PAKISTAN 1.001 1.003 1.002 0.999 1.012 0.994
PERU 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997 1.001
PORTUGAL 0.975 0.991 0.980 0.995 1.168 0.929
RUSSIA 1.097 1.066 1.088 1.008 0.756 1.124
SOUTH AFRICA 0.991 0.997 0.993 0.998 1.063 0.965
SPAIN 0.984 0.995 0.988 0.996 1.104 0.946
SWEDEN 1.050 1.030 1.044 1.005 0.818 1.092
SWITZERLAND 1.079 1.027 1.063 1.015 0.667 1.186
THAILAND 1.015 1.014 1.015 1.000 0.955 1.046
TURKEY 0.991 1.002 0.996 0.996 1.089 0.948
UNITED KINGDOM 1.000 1.005 1.001 0.998 1.043 0.984
UNITED STATES 0.955 0.973 0.959 0.996 1.228 0.944
VENEZUELA 1.104 1.052 1.086 1.017 0.725 1.170
REST OF WORLD 1.017 1.015 1.016 1.001 0.972 1.020
Simulation results are expressed as a ratio of the counterfactual to the 
actual value.  Simulation based on theta = 8.28.
price indicesTABLE V: CHANGES IN WAGES, GDP, AND MANUFACTURING PRICES
(FACTOR IMMOBILITY) 
mfg price
country mfg non-mfg GDP index
ALGERIA 0.951 1.402 1.378 1.059
ARGENTINA 1.027 1.055 1.049 1.036
AUSTRALIA 1.064 0.855 0.877 0.995
AUSTRIA 1.032 1.041 1.039 1.036
BELGIUM/LUXEM 1.006 1.068 1.059 1.032
BRAZIL 1.019 1.083 1.069 1.033
CANADA 0.977 1.043 1.032 1.003
CHILE 1.011 1.073 1.063 1.028
CHINA/HK 1.024 1.043 1.036 1.034
COLOMBIA 1.030 1.006 1.010 1.021
DENMARK 1.012 1.117 1.105 1.039
EGYPT 1.023 1.113 1.096 1.062
FINLAND 0.992 1.128 1.101 1.045
FRANCE 1.033 1.028 1.028 1.030
GERMANY 0.997 1.096 1.076 1.037
GREECE 1.081 0.888 0.904 1.010
INDIA 1.022 1.043 1.040 1.035
INDONESIA 1.025 1.042 1.037 1.032
IRELAND 1.034 1.015 1.019 1.024
ISRAEL 0.979 1.082 1.068 1.026
ITALY 1.037 1.020 1.023 1.030
JAPAN 1.003 1.119 1.095 1.046
KOREA 0.981 1.130 1.092 1.034
MA/PHI/SING 0.956 1.174 1.114 1.029
MEXICO 1.002 0.982 0.985 1.001
NETHERLANDS 0.936 1.181 1.150 1.037
NEW ZEALAND 1.048 0.909 0.930 0.997
NORWAY 0.943 1.322 1.283 1.071
PAKISTAN 1.028 1.012 1.015 1.023
PERU 1.018 1.022 1.022 1.020
PORTUGAL 1.103 0.915 0.941 1.014
RUSSIA 0.983 1.300 1.250 1.077
SOUTH AFRICA 1.052 0.975 0.988 1.018
SPAIN 1.070 0.954 0.971 1.017
SWEDEN 0.953 1.210 1.164 1.046
SWITZERLAND 0.909 1.368 1.282 1.041
THAILAND 1.005 1.080 1.054 1.034
TURKEY 1.060 0.953 0.975 1.024
UNITED KINGDOM 1.044 0.997 1.003 1.026
UNITED STATES 1.065 0.827 0.858 0.998
VENEZUELA 1.017 1.316 1.267 1.061
REST OF WORLD 1.022 1.053 1.048 1.034
Simulation results are expressed as a ratio of  the counterfactual
to the actual value. Simulation based on theta = 8.28.
wagesTABLE VI: CHANGES IN REAL WAGES, REAL GDP, AGGREGATE PRICE INDEX, AND REAL ABSORPTION
(FACTOR IMMOBILITY)
real aggregate real
country mfg non-mfg GDP price index absorption
ALGERIA 0.730 1.076 1.057 1.303 1.195
ARGENTINA 0.983 1.010 1.004 1.045 1.032
AUSTRALIA 1.197 0.961 0.987 0.889 0.926
AUSTRIA 0.993 1.002 1.000 1.039 1.005
BELGIUM/LUXEM 0.958 1.017 1.008 1.051 1.054
BRAZIL 0.954 1.014 1.001 1.068 1.024
CANADA 0.948 1.013 1.002 1.030 1.026
CHILE 0.953 1.011 1.002 1.061 1.026
CHINA/HK 0.988 1.007 1.000 1.036 1.042
COLOMBIA 1.019 0.995 0.999 1.010 0.991
DENMARK 0.921 1.016 1.005 1.099 1.034
EGYPT 0.937 1.019 1.004 1.092 1.048
FINLAND 0.901 1.025 0.999 1.101 1.055
FRANCE 1.004 0.999 1.000 1.028 0.998
GERMANY 0.925 1.017 0.998 1.078 1.039
GREECE 1.179 0.969 0.986 0.917 0.939
INDIA 0.983 1.003 1.000 1.040 1.010
INDONESIA 0.987 1.004 0.999 1.038 1.008
IRELAND 1.018 0.999 1.004 1.015 1.002
ISRAEL 0.916 1.012 0.999 1.069 1.024
ITALY 1.013 0.997 1.000 1.024 0.992
JAPAN 0.913 1.020 0.997 1.098 1.035
KOREA 0.886 1.020 0.986 1.107 1.030
MA/PHI/SING 0.863 1.061 1.006 1.107 1.171
MEXICO 1.015 0.994 0.997 0.988 0.989
NETHERLANDS 0.826 1.042 1.014 1.134 1.111
NEW ZEALAND 1.114 0.966 0.988 0.941 0.922
NORWAY 0.761 1.067 1.036 1.239 1.201
PAKISTAN 1.013 0.997 0.999 1.015 0.993
PERU 0.996 1.001 1.000 1.022 1.002
PORTUGAL 1.166 0.968 0.995 0.946 0.930
RUSSIA 0.797 1.054 1.013 1.234 1.133
SOUTH AFRICA 1.063 0.985 0.999 0.990 0.966
SPAIN 1.096 0.977 0.995 0.976 0.945
SWEDEN 0.819 1.040 1.001 1.164 1.087
SWITZERLAND 0.721 1.085 1.018 1.260 1.178
THAILAND 0.949 1.020 0.995 1.059 1.040
TURKEY 1.082 0.973 0.995 0.980 0.947
UNITED KINGDOM 1.038 0.992 0.998 1.005 0.983
UNITED STATES 1.237 0.960 0.996 0.861 0.944
VENEZUELA 0.831 1.076 1.036 1.223 1.196
REST OF WORLD 0.978 1.007 1.003 1.045 1.024
Simulation results are expressed as a ratio of  the counterfactual
to the actual value.  Simulation based on theta = 8.28. 
real wagesTABLE VII: CHANGES IN WAGES, GDP, AND MANUFACTURING PRICES
(FACTOR IMMOBILITY, NO ADJUSTMENT ON EXTENSIVE MARGIN)
mfg price
country mfg non-mfg GDP index
ALGERIA 1.382 1.561 1.551 1.177
ARGENTINA 1.102 1.114 1.112 1.087
AUSTRALIA 0.865 0.724 0.740 0.899
AUSTRIA 1.094 1.097 1.096 1.093
BELGIUM/LUXEM 1.076 1.114 1.108 1.072
BRAZIL 1.074 1.139 1.125 1.075
CANADA 0.876 0.957 0.943 0.911
CHILE 1.062 1.125 1.115 1.050
CHINA/HK 1.068 1.090 1.082 1.082
COLOMBIA 1.030 1.008 1.011 1.014
DENMARK 1.117 1.199 1.190 1.108
EGYPT 1.226 1.311 1.295 1.226
FINLAND 1.133 1.310 1.274 1.152
FRANCE 1.064 1.059 1.060 1.060
GERMANY 1.085 1.215 1.188 1.105
GREECE 0.935 0.807 0.817 0.970
INDIA 1.071 1.096 1.093 1.083
INDONESIA 1.073 1.102 1.094 1.085
IRELAND 1.042 1.030 1.033 1.027
ISRAEL 0.973 1.076 1.061 1.038
ITALY 1.060 1.045 1.048 1.061
JAPAN 1.135 1.296 1.262 1.169
KOREA 1.039 1.250 1.196 1.087
MA/PHI/SING 1.074 1.336 1.264 1.053
MEXICO 0.861 0.852 0.853 0.903
NETHERLANDS 1.081 1.309 1.280 1.093
NEW ZEALAND 0.884 0.798 0.811 0.908
NORWAY 1.336 1.573 1.549 1.250
PAKISTAN 1.007 0.988 0.991 1.013
PERU 1.000 1.008 1.007 1.006
PORTUGAL 1.004 0.826 0.851 0.977
RUSSIA 1.333 1.634 1.587 1.315
SOUTH AFRICA 1.007 0.930 0.943 0.996
SPAIN 0.995 0.890 0.905 0.992
SWEDEN 1.104 1.397 1.346 1.144
SWITZERLAND 1.086 1.555 1.468 1.117
THAILAND 1.050 1.141 1.110 1.084
TURKEY 1.023 0.922 0.943 1.027
UNITED KINGDOM 1.039 0.994 1.000 1.039
UNITED STATES 0.889 0.673 0.701 0.891
VENEZUELA 1.352 1.531 1.502 1.213
REST OF WORLD 1.078 1.090 1.088 1.083
Simulation results are expressed as a ratio of  the counterfactual
to the actual value.  Simulation based on sigma = 2.
wagesTABLE VIII: CHANGES IN REAL WAGES, REAL GDP, AGGREGATE PRICE INDEX, AND REAL ABSORPTION
(FACTOR IMMOBILITY, NO ADJUSTMENT ON EXTENSIVE MARGIN)
real aggregate real
country mfg non-mfg. GDP price index absorption
ALGERIA 0.953 1.077 1.070 1.450 1.205
ARGENTINA 1.002 1.013 1.011 1.100 1.042
AUSTRALIA 1.129 0.946 0.965 0.766 0.901
AUSTRIA 0.999 1.001 1.001 1.095 1.006
BELGIUM/LUXEM 0.984 1.019 1.014 1.094 1.060
BRAZIL 0.959 1.017 1.005 1.120 1.029
CANADA 0.930 1.016 1.001 0.942 1.024
CHILE 0.961 1.018 1.009 1.105 1.036
CHINA/HK 0.986 1.006 0.998 1.084 1.039
COLOMBIA 1.020 0.998 1.002 1.010 0.993
DENMARK 0.949 1.018 1.010 1.178 1.040
EGYPT 0.961 1.027 1.015 1.276 1.051
FINLAND 0.901 1.042 1.013 1.258 1.069
FRANCE 1.004 1.000 1.000 1.059 0.998
GERMANY 0.920 1.030 1.008 1.179 1.049
GREECE 1.107 0.955 0.968 0.844 0.922
INDIA 0.982 1.005 1.001 1.091 1.010
INDONESIA 0.979 1.006 0.999 1.096 1.009
IRELAND 1.012 1.000 1.003 1.030 1.003
ISRAEL 0.912 1.008 0.995 1.067 1.021
ITALY 1.009 0.995 0.997 1.051 0.990
JAPAN 0.902 1.030 1.003 1.258 1.038
KOREA 0.857 1.032 0.987 1.211 1.031
MA/PHI/SING 0.893 1.111 1.052 1.202 1.225
MEXICO 0.992 0.982 0.983 0.868 0.978
NETHERLANDS 0.874 1.058 1.035 1.237 1.132
NEW ZEALAND 1.057 0.953 0.968 0.837 0.895
NORWAY 0.912 1.074 1.057 1.465 1.225
PAKISTAN 1.011 0.992 0.995 0.995 0.990
PERU 0.992 1.001 0.999 1.008 1.001
PORTUGAL 1.152 0.948 0.976 0.872 0.913
RUSSIA 0.867 1.062 1.032 1.538 1.156
SOUTH AFRICA 1.058 0.976 0.990 0.952 0.957
SPAIN 1.075 0.961 0.978 0.925 0.929
SWEDEN 0.833 1.055 1.016 1.325 1.104
SWITZERLAND 0.771 1.104 1.042 1.408 1.200
THAILAND 0.942 1.024 0.995 1.115 1.040
TURKEY 1.064 0.959 0.980 0.962 0.932
UNITED KINGDOM 1.032 0.987 0.993 1.006 0.979
UNITED STATES 1.243 0.940 0.980 0.716 0.929
VENEZUELA 0.956 1.083 1.062 1.414 1.231
REST OF WORLD 0.991 1.003 1.001 1.087 1.023
Simulation results are expressed as a ratio of  the counterfactual
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Figure 6: Change in Mfg. Share, Immobile Sourcing